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The Five Bases of Extraterritorial




Jurisdiction may be divided into two general types, territorial and ex-
traterritorial. Reasonable assertion of either form of jurisdiction involves
the determination of whether the exercise of jurisdiction by a legislative,
executive, administrative or judicial body is proper given the activity in
question.1
There is little debate that a nation may exercise territorial jurisdiction
over and thus promulgate laws regulating persons, things or transactions
within the nation's territory 2 There is controversy, however, as to when
the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction comports with international
law. This controversy has grown, particularly since World War IM It is
clear the problems and conflicts of extraterritorial jurisdiction will con-
tinue to expand as the economies of the world become increasingly inter-
twined, and as governments attempt to extend the reach of their own laws
to exert specific economic or political agendas.
Although there is growing conflict abroad over the proper scope of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, this conflict is belied by the fact that under
U.S. law, the presumption against extraterritoriality assumes that all laws
are prima facie territorial and should not be applied extraterritorially ab-
sent a clear congressional mandate. The presumption against extraterrito-
riality ignores whether extraterritorial application is proper and has gener-
ally allocated the determination of extraterritorial application of a given
statute to the courts through a series of exceptions to the presumption.
This Note reviews various statutory and case law applications of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction and the inherent flaws of the current presumption
against extraterritoriality in the United States, progressively revising the
* Member, Class of 1998. B.A., American University of Paris, 1987.
1. RESTATEMENr (IRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIOOS LAW § 401 (1986).
2. ROGER AU:oRD, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust Laws, 33 VA. L
INT'LL. 1, 5-6 (1992). See also RES'rATEMENT (HIRD), supra note 1, at § 402 cmt. c.
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presumption based upon its actual application. This Note also provides a
new paradigm for determining under what situations and in what manner
extraterritorial jurisdiction is proper.
I. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
After the Supreme Court's 1909 decision in American Banana v.
United Fruit,3 U.S. courts generally have relied on the presumption against
extraterritoriality which assumes that "all legislation is prima facie territo-
rial."4  The presumption against extraterritoriality repre;ents a long-
standing judgment by the courts that Congress, when it legislates, is "pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions," and that Congress does not
intend for legislation to contravene the basic legal principles of other na-
tions.5
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American
Oil Company (Aramco)6 the Court reiterated the principle that "Congress
has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the
United States," but that unless a contrary intent appears, legislation is not
meant to be extraterritorial.7
The presumption against extraterritoriality is, however, flawed in two
respects. First, Congress is not capable of determining when a statute
should apply extraterritorially, except in certain limited situations. Sec-
ond, the presumption, as applied in the courts, fails to differentiate be-
tween situations where a simple minimum contacts analysis is necessary,
as opposed to where a true extraterritorial analysis is required!
3. See American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
4. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 366 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (reiterating the pre-
sumption, and holding that the eight hour law provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
did not apply to U.S. contractors working abroad under agreements with the U.S. gov-
ernment, absent controlling statutory language).
5. See id.
6. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arab-American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991). Aramco is similar to Foley Bros. in that both cases dealt with the
regulation of a U.S. employer's activities abroad. Aramco, a Delaware corporation, em-
ployed Petitioner Boureslan in Saudi Arabia. Boureslan alleged that he had been dis-
charged in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Aramco, 499 U.S.
at 247. The Court held that Title VII did not have sufficiently definite language to over-
come the presumption against extraterritoriality and apply to conduct which occurred en-
tirely ibroad. See id. at 259.
7. See id. at 248.
8. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (holding
that the balancing test set forth in Timberlane was only appropriate where there was a
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A. Problems with Inferring Congressional Intent
The presumption properly attempts to consider ideas of comity and
territorial bounds to a nation's laws. Unfortunately, the presumption at-
tempts to do so based on the flawed premise that Congress is either capable
of, or chooses to determine whether a law should apply extraterritorially.
In reality, Congress generally does not consider Whether a law should or
may have occasion to apply extraterritorially. Typically this determination
is left to the courts.
For example, in Aramco, the Court provided several examples of stat-
utes where Congress specifically provided for extraterritorial application.
These statutes included the Export Administration Act of 1979,9 which
extends jurisdiction under the Act to any U.S. entity or foreign subsidiary;
the Coast Guard Act,'0 which allows for searches and seizure on the high
seas; 19 U.S.C. § 1701, which grants customs enforcement power on the
high seas; the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,11 which defines
a national of the United States as any citizen; and, the ADEA, 12 which pro-
vides that the term "employee" includes any person who is a citizen of the
United States employed by an U.S. employer or its foreign subsidiary in a
workplace in a foreign country.
13
Given the limited extent of these statutes, the Court's statement in
Aramco, that "Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement
that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous oc-
casions on which it has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application
of a statute" seems rather suspect. 14 A more precise conclusion is that
Congress is able to legislate extraterritorially when there is an express need
to do so to accomplish a discrete purpose, but that Congress' purpose may
not comport with international law and that in general Congress will not
consider possible extraterritorial issues that may arise under a statute.
Two facts support this conclusion: (1) in the areas where extraterrito-
rial application of a law has been most often and most broadly upheld, that
is, antitrust, securities, and trademark regulation, the statutes themselves
true conflict). See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976) See also notes 79-80 and accompanying discussion.
9.50 U.S.C. § 2415(2) (1996).
10. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1996).
11. 22 U.S.C. § 5001(5)(A), rep'd Pub. L. No. 103-149, 107 Stat. 1503 (1993).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1996).
13. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258.
14. See id.
1997]
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are silent as to any extraterritorial application; 15 (2) in general, when Con-
gress does legislate extraterritorialy, such as in the Helms-Burton Act
16
and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,17 the assertions of jurisdic-
tional reach conflict with current international standards.
As such, the presumption against extraterritoriality should be changed
to read:
All laws are prima facie territorial, but neither silence nor a clear statu-
tory mandate is dispositive of whether there is a need to apply a law ex-
traterritorially or whether such extraterritorial application would com-
port with international law.
This modification, while accurate, must be tempered by the general
view of the courts that no enactment of Congress can be challenged on the
ground that it violates customary international law.'8 Although this posi-
tion is not necessarily mandated by the Constitution, and it is conceivable
that the Framers intended the courts to give effect to international law,
U.S. law is not formally required to comport with international law.
19
Therefore the presumption should read:
All laws are presumed territorial absent contrary Congressional intent.
However, Congressional silence is not dispositive of whether a law may
be applied extraterritorially, and the presumption may be rebutted in
certain situations.
With this modification in mind, the discussion will now review the
accepted bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law, and
determine what additional modifications to the presumption are necessary
to comport with current standards in the courts.
15. See infra discussion at section III(A)-(C).
16. 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996).
17. 22 U.S.C. § 5001(5)(A) (1992), rep'd Pub. L. No. 103-149, 107 Stat. 1503
(1993).
18. See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
19. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, 100 HARV. L.
RE. 853, 877 (1987).
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I. The Five Bases Of Jurisdiction To Prescribe.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 20 states that there
are five recognized bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law
as follows:
(1) Nationality: A nation may regulate the conduct of its citizens and
assert jurisdiction over its citizens wherever they are located;2
(2) Effects: A nation may regulate activities which have a substantial
territorial effect;2
(3) Protective: A nation may regulate extraterritorial conduct where
there is as connection between the act and national security;
(4) Universality: Any state may assert jurisdiction over activities
which are universally considered crimes against humanity;2
(5) Passive Personality: A state may assert jurisdiction where the vic-
tim of the act is a national of the state asserting jurisdiction. s
Restatement (Third) section 403 further provides that jurisdiction un-
der any of the five bases is subject to a balancing test to determine the rea-
sonableness of asserting jurisdiction to prescribe over a matter. The bal-
ancing test requires consideration of eight factors: (1) substantiality of
effect; (2) connections of the defendant with the forum; (3) character of the
activity; (4) existence of justified expectations; (5) importance of regula-
tion; (6) extent to which regulation is consistent with international norms;
(7) extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the ac-
tivity; and (8) the likelihood of conflict with another nation.
20. RESTATEMENT (TIRD), supra note 1, § 402, provides that, [s]ubject to § 403,
a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
(1) (a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its territory,
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial ef-
fect within its territory
(2) the activities, status, interests or relations of its nationals outside as well as
inside its territory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is di-
rected against the security of the state or a limited class of other state interests.
21. See RESTATEMENT 'rMD), supra jiote 1, § 402(2).
22. Id. at § 402(1)(c).
23. Id. at § 402(3).
24. Id. at § 404.
25. Id. at § 402 crnt. g.
19971
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A. Nationality Principle
Restatement (Third) section 402(2) provides that, subject to section
403, a state may regulate "the activities, interests, status or relations of its
nationals outside as well as within its territory. 2 6 The idea that underlies
nationality jurisdiction is that the citizens of a nation owe certain duties to
their homeland, regardless of their current residence, as long as they
maintain bonds of allegiance. Nationality jurisdiction is considered linked
to the burdens and benefits of citizenship. Typical assertions of jurisdic-
tion under the nationality principle27 therefore include the application of
tax statutes and the prosecution of U.S. nationals for treason and relations
with enemy nations.2
1. Relations With the Enemy
In Chandler v. United States,29 Chandler was charged with and con-
victed of treason based on his activities as a radio announcer for the Ger-
man Propaganda Ministry during World War Hl.30 The Treason Statute,
which is the codification of Article I, section 3 of the Constitution, reads,
"'if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United Slates of Amer-
ica, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving
them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere.., such per-
son or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the United
States. 31
Chandler challenged the conviction on the grounds that the treason
statute lacked language specifying extraterritorial application; and there-
fore the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply and his activi-
ties in Germany should not be actionable in the United States.
3 2
The First Circuit rejected Chandler's contention, finding that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to acts of treason. The
court reasoned that although the treason statute contains no territorial
limitation, the history of the statute showed that the absence of territorial
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 402(2).
27. The states also use the nationality principle regarding marriage, divorce, es-
tate and inheritance.
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 402(2) reporter's note: 1.
29. See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948).
30. See id. at 924.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1996).
32. See Chandler, 171 F.2d at 929.
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language simply meant that there was to be no jurisdictional limits on acts
of treason.33 In support of this assertion, the court referred to a proposed
substitute to the draft of Article Ill, section 3 of the Constitution. The sub-
stitute read, "that if a man do levy war agst. the U.S. within their territo-
ries, or be adherent to the enemies of the U.S. within the said territories,
giving them aid and comfort within their territories or elsewhere, and
thereof be probably attainted of open deed by the People of his condition,
he shall be adjudged guilty of Treason."' 4 The court reasoned that the
Constitutional Convention intended to encompass foreign acts of treason
by any U.S. national by its specific deletion of the territorial limitation.3
In a similar case, Kawakita v. United States,36 the Supreme Court reit-
erated the principle that United States citizenship carries with it certain
burdens as well as benefits. One of these burdens is the requirement of
loyalty to the nation.37 A person who violates that oath is subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States' courts for treason no matter where the act
of treason occurs as long as he retains his bond of allegiance to the coun-
try.
38
Kawakita was born in the United States to Japanese parents. Before
World War I- he returned to Japan and enrolled in Meiji University.
39
Following the outbreak of war, Kawakita remained in Japan and accepted a
position as an interpreter for Oeyama Nickel Industry Company, where he
worked interpreting communications between the Japanese and the Ameri-
can prisoners of war assigned to work at the Oeyama mine and factory.
The acts of treason for which he was convicted involved his conduct to-
ward American prisoners of war.40
Kawakita attempted to defend on the basis that he had renounced his
U.S. citizenship specifically by removing his name as an alien in the
Koseki, a local citizenship registry, which allowed him to obtain work in
33. See id
34. See id (citing 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTIoN, 347-48).
35. See id at 929-30. See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73-74 (1941)
(holding that criminal statutes "dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the gov-
ernment, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality, [are] to be
construed as applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign
country, though there be no express declaration to that effect").
36. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
37. See id at 734.
38. See id
39. See id at 720.
40. See id. at 720-21.
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Japan. Kawakita also cited other acts such as his long residence in Japan
and his fidelity to the Emperor.4' The Court found that Kawakita's acts
did not amount to a renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. Although the acts
may have constituted dual nationality, they were not sufficiently overt to
constitute renunciation, particularly because the removal of his name from
the Koseki was not considered in Japan to be the renunciation of his U.S.
citizenship, but only as the acceptance of the requirements of Japanese na-
tionality which Kawakita already had, based on his birth to Japanese par-
ents.42
Chandler and Kawakita demonstrate that the nationality principle op-
erates to bar application of the presumption against territoriality, and to
allow the assertion of jurisdiction over those owing fidelity to the United
States.
2. Tax Statutes
Restatement (Third) section 411 states that'"... [a] state may exercise
jurisdiction to tax a person, natural or juridical, on the basis of (a) nation-
ality, (b) domicile, or (c) residence."43 Although the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is subject to the requirement of reasonableness under section 403,
courts have given bioad latitude to the legislature in the assertion of tax li-
ability for revenues not specifically linked to the territory.
The use of the unitary state tax provides a good example of the broad
use of nationality jurisdiction and the blurring of the lines of nationality
and domicile for multinational corporations. For example, in Container
Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board,44 the Supreme Court up-
held a California unitary tax on the worldwide income of Container Corpo-
ration, a Delaware corporation doing business in California and in other
States of the United States, and in eight foreign nations through some
twenty subsidiaries.45 California determined that it was entitled to a per-
centage of Container Corporation's global business income based on Cali-
fornia's share of its sales, property, and payroll.
46
41. See id. at 722.
42. See id. at 723.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 411.
44. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
45. See id. at 171-72.
46. See id.
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The Supreme Court upheld California's tax calculation based on the
premise that Container Corporation and its foreign subsidiaries constituted
a unitary business and therefore a tax on a straight percentage of interna-
tional revenues was appropriate.4 The premise behind the unitary tax is
that "certain intangible flows of value within the unitary group serve to
link the various members together as if they were essentially a single en-
tity."4 A multijurisdictional, unitary business enterprise may properly be
taxed under an appropriate percentage formulation which taxes only the
income generated within a state. The Court effectively held that a unitary
multinational enterprise takes on the nationality and domicile of the juris-
diction in which it is doing business. Thus, the sole concern is merely
whether the corporation is doing business within the jurisdiction. This as-
sertion of jurisdiction to tax retains its reasonableness under Restatement
(Third) section 403 because the unitary tax is based only on the portion of
revenues allocated to the taxing state.
Several federal appellate level cases challenged the holding in Con-
tainer Corporation as applied to income of a multinational enterprise
whose parent company is incorporated in a foreign state.49 In 1996, the
Supreme Court ruled on this issue in Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax
Board of California.5° Barclay's argued, in part, that because there were
no meaningful contacts between California and the activities of Barclay's
Group members operating exclusively outside the United States, California
did not have the requisite nexus with Barclay's foreign branches to support
jurisdiction to apply California's unitary tax.5
The Court reiterated its holding in Container Corporation, stating that
the application of the unitary tax was not based on the contact of foreign
subsidiaries with the taxing forum, but on the contact with the unitary
whole.52 Barclay's therefore reinforced the idea that a unitary multina-
tional corporation may have a nationality, but that it takes on the national-
47. See id. at 197.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., EMI, Ltd. v. Bennett, 738 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1984); Shell Petro-
leum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983); Alcan Aluminum, Ltd. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 724 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984).
50. See Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1996).
51. See id. at 312 n.10 (citing Brief for Government of United Kingdom as Ami-
cus Curiae in No. 92-1384, pp. 24-25).
52. See id. at 315.
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ity of the places in which it does business, at least for the purposes of state
taxation.
Therefore, the presumption should again be altered to recognize that a
state may assert jurisdiction to prescribe over its nationals wherever lo-
cated. A possible revision is as follows:
All laws are presumed territorial absent contrary congressional intent.
However, congressional silence is not dispositive of whether a law may
be applied extraterritorially, and the presumption may be rebutted in the
following situations: (1) Nationality Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to pre-
scribe may be asserted over those owing allegiance to a state wherever
located. Nationality jurisdiction is subject to the test of reasonableness
based on the factors set forth in Restatement (Third), section 403.
B. -The Effects Doctrine
The effects doctrine, or as some courts have referred to it, the objec-
tive territorial principle, refers to the ability of the courts to exercise juris-
diction over "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it."53 Underlying this doctrine is
the theory that the detrimental effects constitute an element of the offense
and since they occur within the country, jurisdiction is proper under the ef-
fects doctrine.
The Restatement (Third) section 403 provides that, "a state has juris-
diction to prescribe law with respect to (1)(c) conduct outside its territory4
which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory. '
The area of effects doctrine jurisdiction is one of the most active since
substantial litigation has arisen under the doctrine in the fields of antitrust,
securities, and trademark.
1. Securities Regulation
From the passage of the Securities Exchange Act (SEA)-' in 1934 un-
til the mid-1960s, the courts, relying on the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality, found that the SEA was not intended to apply extraterritori-
ally.5 6  However, by the late 1960's, courts reversed their historical
53. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). See also United States v,
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 402.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a) -(m)(m) (1996).
56. See, e.g., Ferraioli v. Cantor, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 91, 615 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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position and began to uphold extraterritorial application even absent con-
trolling statutory language.57
There were two reasons for allowing extraterritorial application of the
SEA. First, the SEA represents a class of statutes, specifically broad mar-
ket regulations, like the Sherman 8 and Lanham Acts59 where there is the
possibility of widespread harm resulting from a single violation. 6 Second,
by the late 1960s international law recognized the ability of a state to
regulate extraterritorial activities where a portion of the conduct occurred
within the territory, or where there was a substantial effect within the ter-
ritory from activities outside the territory.
6 1
By the early 1990s, the courts had developed a fairly substantial body
of precedent which provided for jurisdiction under the SEA based upon an
57. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,206 (2d Cir. 1968).
58. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37(a) (1996). See discussion infra at sec-
tion III(B)(2).
59. The Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. See discus-
sion infra at section I1I(B)(3).
60. This is a difficult category to define. The cases where the courts have al-
lowed extraterritoriality generally involve situations where there is a broad class of per-
sons affected by a single violation of the statute. For example, antitrust, trademark and
securities violations are situations where numerous people are potentially harmed by a
single wrong. Certainly labor and employment standards legislation has a broad remedial
purpose; however, there is typically an individual plaintiff and thus a lack of general so-
cial harm that would justify extraterritorial application of a statute in the absence of con-
gressional intent.
61. For example, the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, section 17 (1967) provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law: (a) attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such conse-
quences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory; and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its terri-
tory.
Further, section 18 of the Restatement (Second) provides that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its terri-
tory, if either, (a) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of a crime
or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the
rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
1997]
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adequate level of conduct or effects within the United State,,s.62 However,
in 1995 the Second Circuit, in Itoba Limited v. LEP Group PLC,63 changed
the basis for analysis by simultaneously considering factors supporting ei-
ther a conduct or effects test.
In Itoba, the Second Circuit stated that two jurisdictional tests have
emerged, the conduct test and the effects test, but there "is no requirement
that these tests be applied separately and distinctly from each other. In-
deed, an admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture
of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by an American court.
64
The court then determined that under the conduct test, a. federal court
has jurisdiction if (1) the defendant's activities in the United States were
more than merely preparatory to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere;
62. Note here that section 416 of the Restatement (Third), supra note 1, provides
that the United States may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe for securities transactions, as
follows:
(a)(i) any transaction in securities carried out in the United States to which a
national or resident of the United States is a party, or, (ii) any offer to enter into
a securities transaction, made in the United States by or to a national or resident
of the United States;
(b) any transaction in securities (i) carried out, or intended to be carried out on
an organized securities market in the United States, or (ii) carried out, or in-
tended to be carried out, predominantly in the United States, although not on an
organized securities market;
(c) conduct, regardless of where it occurs, significantly related to a transaction
described in Subsection (1)(b), if the conduct has, or is intended to have, a sub-
stantial effect in the United States;
(d) conduct occurring predominantly in the United States, that is related to a
transaction in securities, even if the transaction takes place outside the United
States; or
(e) investment advice or solicitation of proxies or of consents with respect to
securities, carried out predominantly in the United States.
(2) Whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe with re-
spect to transactions or conduct other than those addressed in Subsection (1)
depends on whether such exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable in light of § 403
Effectively this provides a fairly narrow basis for jurisdiction over securities
transactions that would not include nmany of the cases where the courts have al-
lowed extraterritorial jurisdiction under the SEA. In fact, most courts have
looked to the traditional analysis under section 402.
63. See Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
64. See id. at 122.
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and (2) these activities or culpable failures to act within the United States
directly caused the claimed losses.6
Itoba is perhaps best read as saying that what is critical is not whether
the activity relates to conduct or effect, but whether the level of activity is
adequate to support jurisdiction. This reading would bring analysis of ju-
risdiction to prescribe closer to the traditional personal jurisdiction test of
whether there are adequate minimum contacts with the forum. Thus, the
exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe would comport with "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."' 6 It is unclear, however, whether
such an analysis will change the level of activity required to exercise juris-
diction. Certain commentators have argued that Itoba is a radical depar-
ture and allows for the exercise of jurisdiction where it would not have
existed under the conduct or effects test separately.67 This conclusion is not
apparent by a plain reading of Itoba.
The problem with more liberal jurisdiction for fraud actions under the
SEA is that extensive jurisdiction would conflict with the laws of other
nations and would contradict traditional notions of comity and interna-
tional law. Logically, greater clashes should require greater deference to
ideas of comity. However, cases like Itoba and Hartford Insurance seem
to signal less deference to ideas of comity and more liberal exercise of ju-
risdiction.68 As such these cases seem to repudiate at least part of the un-
derlying, reasoning of the presumption against extraterritoriality, that a na-
tions laws are presumed to be territorial to avoid unnecessary conflict with
other nations.
65. See id.
66. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Mark B. Schwartz, Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC: An Apple that
Fell from the Wrong Branch, 22 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 467 (1996).
68. Unfortunately there are no cases following Itoba which have taken up the
possible blending of the conduct and effects tests The one case which uses Itoba as
precedent, John Labatt v. Onex Corporation, does not specifically deal with this portion
of the holding of Itoba and in fact dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction partially in
the interest of comity since to exercise jurisdiction over a transaction which was com-
pletely Canadian would unnecessarily superimpose U.S. securities regulation over exist-
ing Canadian law. See John Labatt Ltd. v. Onex Corp., 890 F. Supp. 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y
1995). It is unclear whether this holding has any relationship to Itoba, based on the
Labatt court's belief that comity plays a substantial role in any analysis concerning juris-
diction to prescribe.
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2 Trademark Laws
The Lanham Act trademark regulation is a second example of the type
of statute where the presumption does not operate. For example, in Steele
v. Bullova Watch,69 the Court ruled that the Lanham Act applied to trade-
mark infringements committed in Mexico by a U.S. citizen. Although the
Lanham Act did not specifically provide for extraterritorial application, the
Court held the Act applied extraterritorially given (1) its broad jurisdic-
tional grant which defined commerce as "all commerce which may law-
fully be regulated by Congress"; 70 (2) the effect of the infringing conduct
within the United States; and (3) that Steele purchased watch parts in the
United States which were incorporated into the infringing products." Note
that Steele, like the subsequent Itoba, blends the elements of effects of for-
eign conduct and the territorial conduct of the defendant.
Moreover, the Steele Court relied on the nationality principle as an
additional basis of jurisdiction, stating that "the United States is not de-
barred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its
own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the
rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. 72 Thus the
Court recognized the power of Congress to regulate the conduct of U.S.
citizens to "prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce."73  Al-
though Steele's conduct in appropriating the Bullova trademark was not,
theoretically, in violation of Mexican law (because he had properly regis-
tered the trademark in Mexico before Bullova) his conduct was nonethe-
less in violation of U.S. law to the extent it infringed on the Bullova
trademark within the prescriptions of the Lanham Act.
7 4
Steele uses a mixture of territorial and effects jurisdiction and tempers
this with a reasonableness test under the nationality principle. Steele indi-
cates that there may be more than one basis for jurisdiction at play in a
69. See Steele v. Bullova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952).
70. This would allow jurisdiction pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the
Constitution, under which Congress has the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." On its face, how-
ever, this constitutional grant of power is not dispositive of whether Congress may regu-
late activities abroad, nor is it conclusive of congressional intent.
71. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 287.
72. See id. at 285-86.
73. See id. at 286.
74. The Court's willingness to extend jurisdiction to extraterritorial acts which
had an effect within the territory was a clear abandonment of strict territorial application
of laws and a change in conflict of laws analysis away from traditional lex focus delicti.
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case. The Steele Court freely mixed bases; commentators criticized the
court in Itoba for doing precisely the same thing. It is possible that juris-
diction over a trademark infringement case is considered more acceptable
under international law given the prevalence of international agreements
restricting trademark infringement, which does not exist to the same degree
for securities violations. Therefore this adds another layer to the question
of reasonableness mentioned in Restatement (Third) section 403, that is,
the extent to which regulation is consistent with international norms. As
such, one more addition may properly be made to the revised presumption,
which should now read:
All laws are presumed territorial absent contrary Congressional intent.
However, Congressional silence is not dispositive of whether a law may
be applied extraterritorially, and the presumption may be rebutted in the
following situation: (1) Nationality Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to pre-
scribe may be asserted over those owing allegiance to a state wherever
located. Nationality jurisdiction is subject to the test of reasonableness
based on the factors .set forth in Restatement (Third) section 403. In all
other situations, if a court determines that extraterritorial jurisdiction is
necessary to effectuate a fair and equitable result, the assertion of juris-
diction must be reasonable based on the factors set forth in Restatement
(Third) section 403.
3. Antitrust Regulation
In the field of antitrust regulation, courts have been willing to inter-
pret the Sherman Act s to apply extraterritorially. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act provides that "every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be ille-
gal."76 Notably, there is no clear statement of congressional intent to have
the Sherman Act apply extraterritorially. However, Judge Hand stated in
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (Alcoa) that although "it
is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in [section
1 of the Sherman Act], without regard to the limitations customarily ob-
served by nations upon the exercise of their power.., it is settled
law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
75. See supra note 58.
76. Id. at § 1.
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its borders which the state reprehends."" Judge Hand concluded that the
Sherman Act applied to the conduct in question which took: place entirely
outside of the United States, but had some territorial effect on exports or
imports.73
The most recent, and perhaps most controversial case in extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, is Hartford Fire Insurance v. California.79 Hartford held
that in antitrust litigation, concerns of comity arise only where there is a
true conflict, that is, where the laws of the foreign state require that a party
act or not act in a certain manner contrary to the laws of the United States.
'In the absence of such a direct conflict, the courts should exercise jurisdic-
tion where there is a substantial effect within the United States.
80
Hartford was premised on the idea that where the effect of the foreign
conduct is substantial it is not in violation of international law to assert ju-
risdiction. This again changes the basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction and
specifically alters the previous revised presumption against extraterritori-
ality. Hartford is consistent with section 402(c) which provides that a state
has jurisdiction to prescribe "conduct outside its territory which has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory." However, it ig-
nores almost all of the balancing factors in section 403, including connec-
tions of the defendant with the forum, existence of justified expectations,
importance of regulation, extent to which regulation is consistent with in-
ternational norms, and extent to which another state may have an interest
in regulating the activity. The only balancing factor considered is the sub-
stantiality of effect and likelihood of conflict with another nation. Argua-
bly, Hartford considers character of the activity, although it is unclear
whether the Hartford test was intended only to apply to antitrust regula-
tion.
Thus, the presumption again should be altered to provide as follows:
All laws are presumed territorial absent contrary Congressional intent.
However, Congressional silence is not dispositive of whether a law may
be applied extraterritorially, and the presumption may be rebutted in the
following situations: (1) Nationality Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to pre-
scribe may be asserted over those owing allegiance to a state wherever
located. Nationality jurisdiction is subject to the test of reasonableness
77. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443.
78. See id. at 444.
79. See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
80. See id. at 798-99.
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based on the factors set forth in Restatement (Third) section 403. (2) Ef-
fects Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to prescribe may be asserted over non-
territorial actors where there is a substantial territorial effect. In general
a showing of substantial effect requires evidence of broad societal or
market harm. In determining whether to assert or decline effects juris-
diction, the court shall consider.only three factors from the Restatement
(Third): substantiality of effect, nature of the activity, and likelihood of
conflict with another nation.
The presumption here begins to take useful form with the recognition
that there are various accepted bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction that
require differing types of analyses.
4. The Helms-Burton Act
Title III of The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
(Helms-Burton)8' rejects the act of state doctrine and allows U.S. courts to
adjudicate claims arising out of the expropriation, over thirty years ago, of
American-owned property in Cuba.
Helms-Burton provides a cause of action against any person who traf-
fics2 in confiscated property of a United States' national for the value of
the property plus treble damages if the trafficking continues after the liti-
gation. Trafficking includes such activities as: selling, transferring, or
leasing the property and engaging in a commercial activity or otherwise
benefiting from the confiscated property.
8 3
Any person engaging in a commercial activity using any property
once owned by U.S. nationals is, therefore, potentially subject to liability
under Helms-Burton. The only limits on the scope of liability are that the
plaintiffs must have been a U.S. citizen at the time of the confiscation, and
must have filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
pursuant to the International Claims Settlement Act.8
The authors of Helms-Burton based its broad assertion of jurisdiction
on the effects doctrine, stating that "[i]nternational law recognizes that a
nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within
81. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023-91
(1997) ("Helms-Burton").
82. Helms-Burton, supra note 81, § 6082.
83. Id.
84. Pub. L. No. 88-666,78 Stat. 1110 (1964), codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643-43k
(1997).
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its territory." 8*5 The question is whether a single act of expropriation, or
even the expropriation of all assets in Cuba previously held by U.S. na-
tionals, actually had a sufficient effect within the United States to merit
the use of the effects doctrine, and even so if the courts should nonetheless
decline jurisdiction.
Professor Lowenfeld forcefully argued that Congress' attempt to rest
jurisdiction on the effects doctrine is improper because it is unreasonable.
86
Professor Lowenfeld bases this argument on the fact that Congress, in
drafting Helms-Burton, took the effects doctrine's jurisdictional language,
quoted above, directly from section 402(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third),
allowing for effects doctrine jurisdiction but ignoring the subsequent re-
quirement that jurisdiction is proper only where it is reasonably in accor-
dance with section 403.87
In light of section 403, Professor Lowenfeld is correct in arguing that
the assertion of jurisdiction under Helms-Burton is unreasonable specifi-
cally because no court has ever asserted effects doctrine juri;diction based
on an effect on an individual plaintiff. As noted above in the discussions
regarding use of the effects doctrine for antitrust and securit:ies violations,
the required effect must be substantial and touch numerous people within
the territory.
This precedential argument survives even Hartford Fire Insurance,"8
which arguably would require, contrary to the Restatement (Third), that the
only time when considerations of international comity preclude the asser-
tion of jurisdiction by a United States' court is when either the effect is not
substantial or where there is a true conflict, or both. A true conflict arises
only when the defendant cannot comply with the laws of both nations.8 9
Conflicting regulatory schemes or the legality of conduct in the place
where it occurs are not adequate conflicts.
90
85. Helms-Burton, supra note 81, § 6081(9).
86. Andreas Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J.
INT'LL. 419,431 (1996).
87. Id.
88. See Harford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 798.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 799. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 415 cmt. j
(the fact that conduct was lawful in the place where it occurred will not bar application of
U.S. antitrust laws); RESTATEmENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 403 cmt. e (no conflict exists
where a person can comply with the laws of both states).
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Applying Hartford to Helms-Burton, the easy answer is that a foreign
company that wished to construct a hotel on land previously owned by a
U.S. national could comply with the laws of the United States which would
incur liability for such an action, and the laws of Cuba which would
merely permit building of the hotel. They would comply with both laws by
not building the hotel. However, is the absence of choice any less a con-
flict than dual liability? In any case the problem is moot, because even
Hartford continued to require a "substantial effect in the United States"
before exercising jurisdiction under the effects doctrine. 91 The purported
effects of the individual expropriations are clearly inadequate to support
jurisdiction under the effects doctrine.
92
Helms-Burton stands as a clear example of the difficulty of assuming
that Congress' provision of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a statute neces-
sarily comports with international law. However, as previously mentioned,
Congress' failure to consider whether a law violates international norms is
not a valid basis for striking down a law.
C. The Universality Principle
The Universality Principle has its origins in the punishment of pirates
on the high seas.93 Because pirates typically owed no allegiance to any one
nation, and their crimes were committed at sea, they were considered to be
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of any nation.? The Universality Prin-
ciple, therefore evolved as an alternate means of asserting non-territorial
jurisdiction based on the premise that piracy and brigandage were so uni-
versally condemned among nations95 that the perpetrators were considered
enemies of all people, and any nation who has custody of the perpetrators
91. See Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 796.
92. This, however, leaves open the question whether a government could bring
an action on behalf of all of its citizens affected by the expropriation, or if the citizens
affected by the expropriations could bring a class action for compensation which would
meet the substantiality requirement under the effects doctrine. Such a procedure, by su-
ing the foreign government directly, would also bypass a second problem with Helms-
Burton not discussed here, the inappropriateness of imposing liability on a third party
who had no connection with the original confiscation.
93. See, e.g., Williard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes,
33 CAL. L. REv. 177, 181-208 (1945).
94. See United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210,232 (1844).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 154, 161 (finding that
piracy is an offense against the law of nations and against the "universal law of society");
The Lotus, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (stating that piracy is an offense against the
law of nations and the pirate the enemy of all mankind).
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may punish them according to its own laws.96 Under modem law, the Uni-
versality Principle is recognized as a proper basis for jurisdiction9 over
"certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism.
' 98
1. Crimes Against Humanity
Much of the development of the Universality Principle relating to
crimes against humanity arose out of World War II and the trials of Nazi
war criminals by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and
other similar postwar tribunals.
99
Before World War If, there was general consensus that war crimes
could only be tried under the doctrine of passive personality, 10° which pro-
vided that a nation could try only those persons who committed acts on a
nation's citizens or property.10' Therefore, for example, the United States
would not be able to try a person who committed crimes against non-
American forces abroad. This view of jurisdiction based on passive per-
sonality was consistent with the doctrine of Nulla Poena Sine Lege, which
provided that the area of war crimes was traditionally one where punish-
ments were not attached.1 2
However, World War II marked the end of traditional warfare and the
beginning of truly global conflict. The idea of passive personality was in-
adequate to assert jurisdiction over the multinational axis powers, by the
multinational allied powers; the crimes were too vast and wide-ranging to
be tried by one state. Yet it was unthinkable, given modern, concepts of
96. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 404. Note, however, that the Re-
statement groups legislation such as the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-terrorism
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2231, which provides for jurisdiction over acts of terrorism di-
rected at U.S. citizens, under the passive personality doctrine. See discussion infra sec-
tion III(E).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 404. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 1, § 443 which provides that, "[a] state's courts may exercise jurisdiction to
enforce the state's criminal laws which punish universal crimes (§ 404) ...."
99. YASALROGAT, THE EICHMANN TRIAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 29 (1961).
100. See discussion infra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
101. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on En-
forcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary. Peace Conference, 14 AM.
J. INT'LL. 147 (1920).
102. Thomas H. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the
Threatened Trials of American Airmen, 15 LoY. L. REV. 43, 53 (1968-69).
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morality, that the doctrine of Nulla Poena would apply and liability would
not be imposed for war crimes.
What was necessary was a basis for jurisdiction that would recognize
the belief that war crimes were crimes against all nations and people, and
that the actions of the Nazis had gone so far beyond traditionally accepted
standards for warfare that Nazi Germany had truly become an outlaw na-
tion. In this sense, the assertion of jurisdiction under Universality Princi-
ple was consistent with the justification for the punishment of pirates upon
which the doctrine was originally based. The convening of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was a manifestation that these
crimes should be heard before the community of nations, which was at
least one victim of the Nazi regime.1
3
There were several problems, however, with the convocation of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the use of the Universality Principle as a basis for
jurisdiction. Specifically, there was an absence of judges from neutral
countries, the specter of "inherent unfairness" in the victor trying the van-
quished, and a lack of review by a higher court. 1°4
The basis for the application of the Universality Principle to war
crimes is the idea that certain crimes by aggressor nations will not be toler-
ated by any nation. If this application of the Universality Principle is to be
anything more than the sovereign will of the victors, however, it must be
used impartially. All crimes against humanity must be brought before a
competent and impartial tribunal, regardless of the identities of the victim
or the perpetrator.
05
Another similar application of the doctrine of Universality was the
North Vietnamese plan to try sixty captured American fighter pilots as war
criminals in 1967.1 6 Under international law and the principles of Nurem-
berg, the American airmen could have been properly tried if a court found
that the United States was waging an aggressive war in violation of inter-
national law. There was and continues to be dispute, however, whether
persons not responsible for the planning and waging of the war can be tried
for crimes against humanity. The answer under international law appears
103. Id. at 48-50.
104. Id. at 51, 65.
105. Similar criticisms were made when Israel tried Adolph Eichmann in 1961.
Although Israel certainly had the strongest interest in the trial, should that have been a
valid basis for trying Eichmann before a jury of his victims?
106. SPONSLER, supra note 102, at 43.
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to be no.1°7 At Nuremberg, there were, however, trials of German civilians
who attacked Allied pilots forced to parachute to the ground when their
planes were shot down during bombing missions.
10 8
Clearly, although the North Vietnamese government bowed to inter-
national pressure and did not to try the airmen, it had at least arguable
grounds for the prosecution of American airmen under the Universality
Principle and the basic tenets of international law and the principles of
Nuremberg. This demonstrates the point that a nation or group of nations
which decides to live by the rule of law must expect to have that law ap-
plied against them as well as by them.
Forty years after World War II, the Sixth Circuit, in Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, found that the extradition of Demjanjuk to Israel was proper
and ordered-him to be extradited to stand trial for war crimes and crimes
against humanity arising out of his alleged activities as a Nazi concentra-
tion camp guard during World War II.1 9 Demjanjuk argued that his extra-
dition from the United States to Israel was improper since the crimes were
committed in Poland and he was not a resident or citizen of Israel. There-
fore, under the U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty,"0 Israel could not charge
him with an extraditable offense since the Treaty provided that the offense
had to be punishable under similar circumstances;"' that is to say that in
order to support extradition, the United States would have to be able to as-
sert jurisdiction over Demjanjuk for the crimes committed.'t 2 Demjanjuk
argued that the sole court with jurisdiction over war crimes was the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Following the disestablishment
of the Nuremberg Tribunal there were no courts that had jurisdiction over
alleged war crimes.'
13
107. See, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 45 AM. J. INT. L. 123, 131 (1951).
108. William F. Fratcher, American Organization for Prosecution of German War
Criminals, 13 Mo. L. REv. 45, 59 (1948).
109. See Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 575.
110. Convention on Extradition between the United States and Israel, Dec. 10,
1962, U.S.-Israel, T.I.A.S. No. 5476.
111. See Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 580.
112. See also In Re: Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1981); In Re: Assarsson,
687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982). Both cases held that the decision to extradite is discre-
tionary where the laws of the requested party do not provide for punishment of the of-
fense under similar circumstances.
113. See Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
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The Sixth Circuit disagreed with this reasoning, finding that where ju-
risdiction is properly based on the Universality Principle, the location of
the crimes, and the nationality of the perpetrator or the victims are irrele-
vant. Further, the court reasoned that the Nuremberg Tribunal was merely
a specialized court for the purposes of trying war crimes arising out of
World War ]I, but that any court in any nation whether or not extant at the
time of the commission of the crimes could properly assert jurisdiction in
this matter.
Therefore, the Universality Principle stands as an exception to the
presumption against extraterritoriality because any nation may prosecute
crimes under universal jurisdiction, such as war crimes, piracy, slavery,
and genocide. With this in mind the presumption is once again altered to
reflect universality as follows:
All laws are presumed territorial absent contrary Congressional intent.
However, Congressional silence is not dispositive of whether a law may
be applied extraterritorially, and the presumption may be rebutted in the
following situations: (1) Nationality Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to pre-
scribe may be asserted over those owing allegiance to a state wherever
located. Nationality jurisdiction is subject to the test of reasonableness
based on the factors set forth in Restatement (Third) section 403; (2)
Effects Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to prescribe may be asserted over non-
territorial actors where there is a substantial territorial effect. In general
a showing of substantial effect requires evidence of broad societal or
market harm. In determining whether to assert or decline effects juris-
diction, the court shall consider only three factors from the Restatement
(Third), substantiality of effect, nature of the activity, and likelihood of
conflict with another nation; (3) Universal Jurisdiction: A nation may
assert jurisdiction over actors perpetrating certain crimes including war
crimes, genocide, piracy, and slavery without regard to the location of
the crimes, the nationality of the actor or victims, or the balancing fac-
tors of Restatement (Third) section 403.
D. Protective Principle
Protective principle jurisdiction deals with the right of a state to pun-
ish a limited class of offenses which compromise the security of the nation
or the integrity of its government, and which are committed outside of the
territory by non-nationals' 14 This class of offenses generally deals with
114. RBsTATEMENT (IDM), supra note I, § 402 cmt f.
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counterfeiting, drug trafficking and conspiracy to violate immigration
laws.
15
One of the seminal cases regarding protective principle jurisdiction is
United States v. Bowman,116 which held that contrary to the presumption
against extraterritoriality, federal statutes are not necessarily limited to acts
within the territory even when they are silent as to extraterritorial applica-
tion. The Bowman Court distinguished two classes of penal legislation: (1)
laws dealing with the peace and good order of the community, including
"assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement, and
frauds of all kinds."' 7 This class of laws should only be applied territori-
ally unless Congress expresses a.contrary intent; (2) laws which punish
fraud against the government without regard to location of the act. For this
second class of laws, extraterritoriality should be presumed from the nature
of the act, since the purpose of such statutes is to allow the Government
"to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated."' 8
1. Counterfeiting
In United States v. Birch,k " 9 defendant Birch was a civilian employee
of the U.S. Department of Defense in Germany. A German court tried and
convicted Birch and his wife for mistreating a servant they employed.
Pending appeal of the German case, they were released from prison on the
condition that they surrender their passports and other identification.
Birch and his wife, however, managed to obtain U.S. military identifica-
tions and leave orders and fled Germany for the United States. 120 The
Birches were subsequently captured and charged with violation of 18
U.S.C. § 499 based on the counterfeiting of military identifications.
On appeal, the Birches did not question the ability of the United
States to exercise jurisdiction under the protective principle, but argued
that the principle should not apply absent express Congressional intent.
Under this premise, the Birches were challenging the precedent of United
States v. Bowman.'2' The Birches contended that the court should follow
115. Id.
116. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
117. See id. at 97-98.
118. See id.
119. See United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1972).
120. See id. at 810.
121. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
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more recent cases which held that a statute should not apply extraterritori-
ally absent specific Congressional intent.
12
The court rejected this contention and concluded that in light of the
offense of falsification of military documents, protective principle juris-
diction was appropriate. Further, the court found it unnecessary to look to
the statutory language to determine extraterritoriality because it is pre-
sumed from the nature of the offense.'2
2. Drug Trafficking
For drug trafficking offenses, protective principle jurisdiction has
been used to cast a wide net covering not only drug offenses, but offenses
which occur as a part of drug trafficking including murder and conspiracy.
For example, in United States v. Felix-Gutierrez,124 the Ninth Circuit held
that jurisdiction was properly exercised over the defendant who was con-
victed as an accessory after the fact to murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency Agent. 5 Felix-Gutierrez's acts occurred entirely in Mexico and
involved assisting Caro-Quintero in escaping from Mexico to the United
States in order to avoid arrest.
On appeal Felix-Gutierrez argued that a U.S. court did not have juris-
diction to try him for activities which occurred entirely outside of the
United States."2 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that it is generally
constitutionally permissible to apply U.S. penal laws extraterritorially.127
The courts, however, must look to both express or implied congressional
intent and principles of international law to determine whether a given
statute should have extraterritorial application.128
122. See, e.g., Foley Brothers, supra note 4; American Banana, supra note 3. See
also Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545,548 (9th Cir. 1960). In Rocha, the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a conviction for falsification of immigration documents, relying in part on the
protective principle, and in part on the adverse effect produced as a result of the alien's
entry into the United States. The Rocha court used Strassheim, supra note 53, and Alu-
minum Company of America, supra note 53, as support for its decision.
123. See Birch, 470 F.2d at 811-12.
124. See United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1991).
125. See id at 1203.
126. See id at 1204.
127. See id. See also Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th
Cir. 1984); United States v. King 552 F.2d 833, 850 (9th Cir. 1976).
128. See id. (citing Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98).
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The court reasoned that although the statute under which Felix-
Gutierrez was convicted129 was silent as to its extraterritorial application,
the effectiveness of the statute would be compromised if offenses such as
being an accessory after the fact in the killing of a DEA agent outside of
the territory, were immune from prosecution simply because of the loca-
tion of the crime.130 The court continued that the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction comported with the principle of protective jurisdiction be-
cause the underlying crime directly affected national security and on-going
attempts to block the importation of illegal drugs. The exercise of juris-
diction for the murder itself was proper. Therefore, the exercise of juris-
diction under the accessory after the fact statute was also proper.1
3 1
In United States v. Vasquez-Velasco,132 the Ninth Circuit cast the net
under protective principle jurisdiction even wider than in Felix-
Gutierrez.133 In Vasjuez-Velasco, the defendant was tried and sentenced to
life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, the federal racketeering statute,
for his participation in the murders of two American tourists in Mexico.
The court held that extraterritorial application of the statute was
proper although the victims of the crimes were not U.S. government
agents, as in Felix-Gutierrez. The court reasoned that because Vasquez-
Velasco's associates mistook the American tourists for DEA agents and
killed them in retaliation for DEA activities in Mexico, the violent crime
was directed against the United States as a response to its enforcement ef-
forts in Mexico. These murders, like that of the DEA agent Camarena in
Felix-Gutierrez, were performed to further the "cartel's drug smuggling
activities by intimidating the DEA from continuing its enforcement activi-
ties against the cartel's drug trafficking. Such actions could also intimidate
local police and drug agencies, thereby inhibiting them from cooperating
with the DEA. In this context, the murder of American citizens has an
equally direct and adverse impact on our nation's security interest in com-
bating the importation and trafficking of illegal narcotics.
134
129. 18 U.S.C. § 3.
130. See Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204.
131. See id. at 1205. Note that the court bases jurisdiction on the protective prin-
ciple, passive personality and effects without differentiating if any basis alone would be
inadequate.
132. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1993).
133. See Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1204.
134. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 842.
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The court went on to stress, however, that although the protective
principle of jurisdiction allows the courts to assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion absent specific congressional intent, jurisdiction must be reasonable
under principles of international law.135 The exercise of protective princi-
ple jurisdiction would have been unreasonable for the random murder of an
American abroad, 136 but here, because the act was related to the perpetua-
tion of an illegal drug cartel, protective jurisdiction was appropriately ex-
ercised. 37
3. Conspiracy to Violate Immigration Laws
In United State v. Khalje,138 defendant, a foreign national, was
charged with and convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 for making
false statements on an application for a U.S. visa.1 39 On appeal, Khalje ar-
gued that because the false statements were made at the U.S. Consulate in
Montreal, the adverse effects within the United States needed to support
jurisdiction were lacking.14° Khalje asserted that the District Court there-
fore improperly exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction under the effects
doctrine. 14 1 The court, however, found jurisdiction was proper under the
protective principle, "which requires only a potentially adverse effect on
security or governmental functions," in this case, control of immigration. 147
Protective Jurisdiction therefore requires that another caveat be added
to the presumption against extraterritoriality set forth at section 11(D),
above, as follows:
135. See id.
136. However, the exercise of jurisdiction for the killing of an American tourist
abroad would possibly be proper under the passive personality doctrine See discussion
infra section III(E).
137. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 842.
138. See United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1981).
139. Seeid at91.
140. Note that the courts have routinely sustained convictions without even con-
sidering the jurisdictional question, based on statutes which impose criminal liability on
aliens for committing perjury in U.S. Consulates in foreign countries. See, e.g., 22
U.S.C. § 1203. In addition, one court upheld jurisdiction for a violation of falsification
of immigration documents based on the territorial principle, on the theory that the United
States Consulate was part of United States territory. See United States v. Archer, 51 F.
Supp. 708, 709 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
141. See Khalje, 658 F.2d at 92. See also discussion of the effects doctrine supra
section III(C).
142. See Khalje, 658 F.2d at 92. See also United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8
(2d Cir. 1968).
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(4) Protective Jurisdiction: A state may assert jurisdiction to prescribe
over a non-nationals for class of offenses which have potentially ad-
verse effects on the security of a nation or governmental functions. The
offenses generally include counterfeiting, drug trafficking and conspir-
acy to violate immigration laws. No test of reasonableness is required,
however jurisdiction is only proper where there is a clear link to gov-
ernmental functions or national security.
E. Passive Personality
Under the passive personality principle, jurisdiction is asserted based
on the nationality of the victim. Traditionally, this principle has not been
accepted as a sufficient basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction for ordinary
torts and crimes.
143
The resistance to passive personality jurisdiction arises from the con-
cern that if broadly applied it would lead to indefinite criminad liability for
a nation's citizens for activities unknown to them as illegal. For example,
in the Cutting Case,144 the U.S. Secretary of State protested Mexico's as-
sertion of jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen, who was arrested while traveling
in Mexico and prosecuted and convicted for libel for writing an article in a
Texas newspaper criticizing a Mexican national.
More recently, the passive personality doctrine has become increas-
ingly accepted as an appropriate basis for extraterritoriality when applied
in a limited manner to serious and universally condemned crimes145 such as
terrorist activities' 46 and organized attacks on a state's nationals 47 because
143. See RESTATEMENT (TIR D), supra note 1, at § 402 cmt g; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30(2)
(1965) ("[a] state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the
conduct affects one of its nationals"); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp 212, 216 n.5
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (stating that the nationality of the victim, standing alone, is not suffi-
cient basis for asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction).
144. See Cutting Case, 1887 For. Rel. 751 (1888), reported in 2 J. B. MOORE
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 232-40 (1906).
145. But see United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (1 lth Cir. 1984)
which explicitly relied on the passive personality principle to assert jurisdiction over a
Columbian national charged with conspiracy to murder a D.E.A. agent in Columbia.
Clearly, this was an improper application of passive personality jurisdiction, although it
would have been a proper application of protective jurisdiction.
146. See Terry Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in United
States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 297 (1987)
(discussing bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts: passive personality,
protective, and universality).
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of the victim's nationality.1t The underlying idea is that the concern about
over-extensive application of the passive personality doctrine is mitigated
by the recognition that perpetrators of crimes unanimously condemned by
members of the international community, should be aware of the illegality
of their actions and the possibility of foreign prosecution.
149
For example, the passive personality principle serves as a basis for ju-
risdiction under the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986.150 Specifically, section 1202 of the statute (the hostage taking provi-
sions) provides that it is "a crime to kill, or attempt or conspire to kill, or to
cause serious bodily injury, to a national of the United States outside the
territory of the United States" where the crime committed is intended to
coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian popula-
tion. 
1 51
In United States v. Yunis,' 2 decided in part under the 1986
Antiterrorism Act, Yunis, a resident and citizen of Lebanon, was appre-
hended in the United States and charged with a variety of crimes arising
out of his participation in the hijacking of a Jordanian civilian aircraft in
the Middle East in 1985.153 The only nexus to the United States was the
presence of several U.S. nationals on the hijacked flight."'
Yunis moved to dismiss the entire indictment, arguing that: (1) the
court did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a foreign national for crimes
committed in foreign airspace and on foreign soil; (2) the presence of the
American nationals on board the aircraft was an insufficient basis for exer-
cising jurisdiction under principles of international law; and (3) the United
147. See Convention against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art 5(1)(c), 23 IL.M. 1027, 1030 (authorizing
a state party to exercise jurisdiction "when the victim is a national of that State if that
State considers it appropriate").
148. See RESTATEMENT (THRD), supra note 1, at § 402 cmt. g (noting that the pas-
sive personality doctrine "has been increasingly accepted when applied to terrorist and
other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassi-
nations of a state's ambassadors, or government officials").
149. See, Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice, 11 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 71
(1978).
150. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, supra note
97.
151. Id. at § 1202.
152. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd 924 F.2d
1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
153. See id. at 898.
154. See id. at 899.
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States does not recognize passive personality as a legitimate source of ju-
risdiction.1
55
The court flatly disagreed with Yunis, stating that the international
community recognizes the legitimacy of the passive personality doctrine,
especially as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over hostage takers. 56 The
court noted that the International Convention for the Taking of Hostages
157
approved of the use of the passive personality doctrine, providing that each
signatory state could assert extraterritorial jurisdiction when the offense
was committed "with respect to a hostage who is a national of that state if
that state considers it appropriate"' 58 and that "each state shall establish iu-
risdiction in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory."' h
Similarly, in Ahmad v. Wigen;,I Ahmad, a naturalized United States
citizen, filed petition for writ of habeas corpus to prevent his extradition to
Israel to face charges of murdering Israeli citizens in the firebombing of a
passenger bus in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Ahmad contended that
Israel lacked jurisdiction to try him because under Article 64 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949, the criminal laws of Jordan should have ap-
plied since the acts occurred in an Israeli-occupied portion of Jordan not
actually in Israeli territory.' 6' The court rejected this contention noting
that Israel was not relying on the territorial basis of jurisdiction but instead
on the passive personality doctrine, which was recognized in the United
States and Israel as a basis for criminal jurisdiction.
62
It is, however, difficult to fashion a rule to properly cover passive per-
sonality jurisdiction for the reason that although jurisdiction is prima facie
linked to the nationality of the victim, it is a rare occurrence where an act
of hijacking or terrorism would be specifically directed towards the U.S.
155. See id. at 900.
156. See id. at 901-02. See also Gerald McGinley, The Achillo Lauro Affair-
Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691, 709 (1985) for a discussion of
the use of the passive personality doctrine in U.S. efforts to extradite Zalden, the leader
of the terrorists who hijacked the Achillo Lauro in Egyptian waters and subsequently
killed Leon Klinghoffer, an American citizen.
157. International Convention on the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
158. Id. at Art. V, § 5(a)(D).
159. Id. at Art. V. § 2.
160. See Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
161. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 4, para. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).
162 See Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 398-99.
[Vol. 21:177
The Failure of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
nationals abroad, although it is less rare that an American would be a vic-
tim of such crimes, as in Yunis, simply by coincidence. Passive personality
jurisdiction also has a component of being directed to a certain type of
crime that is universally condemned, but not so condemned as to qualify
for universal jurisdiction.
Given these considerations, a caveat to the presumption for passive
personality jurisdiction may be proposed as follows:
(5) Passive Personality Jurisdiction: A court may assert jurisdiction over
certain universally condemned crimes not included under universality
jurisdiction, such as hijacking and terrorism, where a victim of the
crime is a national and/or where the crime is specifically directed to-
wards U.S. nationals or U.S. interests abroad.
IV. Conclusion
As the above analysis has shown, the current presumption against ex-
traterritoriality fails to take into consideration internationally accepted
bases for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Therefore, in sum, a
proper presumption against extraterritoriality should read as follows:
All laws are presumed territorial absent contrary Congressional intent.
However, Congressional silence is not dispositive of whether a law may
be applied extraterritorially, and the presumption may be rebutted in the
following situations:
(1) Nationality Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to prescribe may be asserted
over those owing allegiance to a state wherever located. Nationality ju-
risdiction is subject to the test of reasonableness based on the factors set
forth in Restatement (Third) section 403.
(2) Effects Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction to prescribe may be asserted over
non-territorial actors where there is a substantial territorial effect. In
general a showing of substantial effect requires evidence of broad so-
cietal or market harm. In determining whether to assert or decline ef-
fects jurisdiction, the court shall consider only three factors from the
Restatement (Third), substantiality of effect, nature of the activity, and
likelihood of conflict with another nation.
(3) Universal Jurisdiction: A nation may assert jurisdiction over actors
perpetrating certain crimes including war crimes, genocide, piracy, and
slavery without regard to the location of the crimes, the nationality of
the actor or victims, or the balancing factors of Restatement (Third)
section 403.
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(4) Protective Jurisdiction: A state may assert jurisdiction to prescribe
over non-nationals for a class of offenses which have potentially ad-
verse effects on the security of a nation or governmental functions. The
offenses generally include counterfeiting, drug trafficking and conspir-
acy to violate immigration laws. No test of reasonableness is required,
however jurisdiction is only proper where there is a clear link to gov-
ernmental functions or national security.
(5) Passive Personality Jurisdiction: A court may assert jurisdiction over
certain universally condemned crimes not included under universality
jurisdiction, such as hijacking and terrorism, where a victim of the
crime is a national and/or where the crime is specifically directed to-
wards U.S. nationals or U.S. interests abroad.
Certainly this analytical framework will not solve all problems of
when the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is proper. It will, how-
ever, provide a paradigm for more accurate analysis of any contemplated
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
